I once worked for translating Schneier's book Email Security (published in 1995, which is now declared outdated by him) into Japanese. At that time he was a technologist on cryptography. The keynote speech in Toyama showed, however, that he was rather interested in psychology and human behavior, which is not necessarily logically predictable and often considered errorneous from technological points of view.
While I read a few people who apparently tweeted Schneier's speech was boring, I found his speech on the psycology of security rather refreshing and interesting. Maybe that's because I've been frequently disillusioned by how technological solutions often backfire. Of course it's not about the details in cryptography or other security protocols which are the primary topics of IWSEC so that might have been boring for the majority of the participants.
I won't go into the details of Schneier's speech, because most of the individual topics are frequently covered in his blog. Let me write about one of the things intrigued me the most; it was about the risk heuristics. People are risk-aversed or trying to have sure gain. And at the same time, they prefer probabilistic loss or risk-taking behavior when they have possibilities of losing something. With this heurisric way of thinking, people usually don't want to pay for having less risky life, and this is exactly one of the reasons why security products don't make good sales.
After the speech, I asked him why he converted from pure technologist to rather a scientist of broader topics including psycology and sociology. Unfortunately I didn't get a definitive answer on what made him so; he only emphasized the sociological aspects of security were equally important and critical as the technological ones. Maybe I could find the answer in one of his books; especially if the reason is a highly personal one, which no one will ever know.